In today's coal mine safety production system is gradually improved, the game relationship between the government, coal mines and workers has rarely been studied. In order to investigate the relationship between the government, coal mines and workers under the safety supervision system, this paper constructs a three-party evolutionary game model under the safety supervision system, uses evolutionary game theory to analyze the evolutionary game process of the game participants, studies the behavior of the three parties in the safety supervision problem and conducts stability analysis, and proposes the supervision strategy for coal mine safety production accordingly. It is found that the game between the government, coal mines and workers is a dynamic evolutionary process, and the government should reasonably determine the size of the interests of all parties involved when formulating the system, balance the interests of all parties, and fully mobilize the enthusiasm of coal mines and workers to participate in the regulation. In addition, the decision of all parties for the supervision will inevitably cause the government to supervise the department of lower earnings, should be compensated by increasing the funding. Finally, the coal mine to ensure their own interests, taking into account the cost of employee supervision required to develop incentive policies. The government sets a reasonable safety deposit in a balanced manner of coal mine revenue to increase the cost of coal mine violations. This study helps to study the relationship between the parties under the safety supervision system and provides some theoretical basis for enhancing the role of the supervision system.