关键词: 演化博弈, 煤炭企业, 安全投入, 生产矿井

Abstract: In order to solve the problem of insufficient safety investment under the management structure of China's coal industry, an evolutionary game model of the first line of mines and headquarters under the unified regulation of the government was established from the perspective of evolutionary game based on the bounded rationality of both sides of the game. The dynamic equations were derived from seven evolutionary strategies of both sides of the game. Through model analysis and case verification, it was concluded that the choice of the stability strategy of the two parties was closely related to the supervision cost of the headquarters, the safety cost of the mines, the weight of the economy development index in the performance evaluation system of the group company, the mandatory investment amount of the unit BP. With the decline of the former three and the rise of the mandatory investment amount of the unit BP, the headquarters and mines tend to be strictly supervised and fully invested with greater probability. Finally, in order to urge the headquarters to strictly supervise and fully invest in the mines, relevant policy recommendations were put forward.