煤炭工程 ›› 2023, Vol. 55 ›› Issue (7): 182-187.doi: 10.11799/ce202307030

• 工程管理 • 上一篇    下一篇

高管薪酬粘性对煤炭企业创新效率的影响研究

李玲,王秋玉   

  1. 西安科技大学 管理学院, 陕西 西安 710600
  • 收稿日期:2022-09-15 修回日期:2022-10-21 出版日期:2023-07-20 发布日期:2025-04-07
  • 通讯作者: 王秋玉 E-mail:2364469895@qq.com

Research on the influence of executive compensation stickiness on innovation efficiency of coal enterprises

  • Received:2022-09-15 Revised:2022-10-21 Online:2023-07-20 Published:2025-04-07

摘要:

为提升煤炭企业的创新效率, 文章选取2014年至2020年煤炭上市公司年报数据为样本,通过改进Richardson 投资支出模型, 测量了煤炭企业上市公司的创新效率, 并分析了高管薪酬粘性对其所产生的影响以及董事会特征在中间的调节作用。研究发现: 高管薪酬粘性与煤炭企业的创新效率显著负相关; 董事会规模、董事会的独立性负向调节了高管薪酬粘性对创新效率的作用。研究结论为煤炭企业创新效率提升提供了新思路, 对煤炭企业实现高质量发展有一定的启示意义。

关键词: 高管薪酬粘性, 创新效率, 董事会特征, 煤炭企业

Abstract:

Innovation is an effective way for coal enterprises to achieve high-quality development and "double carbon" goals. This paper selects coal listed companies from 2014 to 2020 as samples, measures the innovation efficiency of coal listed companies by improving Richardson's investment expenditure model, and analyzes the impact of executive compensation stickiness on them and the regulatory role of board characteristics in the middle. The research finds that: executive compensation stickiness is significantly negatively correlated with the innovation efficiency of coal enterprises; The size of the board of directors and the independence of the board of directors negatively regulate the role of executive compensation stickiness on innovation efficiency. The research conclusions provide new ideas for the improvement of innovation efficiency of coal enterprises, and have certain enlightenment significance for coal enterprises to achieve high-quality development.

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